

6.3.1.1

October 15, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Radio Division

VIA: European Representative

FROM: President, AMCOMLIB

SUBJECT: Radio Guidance

ENCLOSURE: Six copies of paper "Improving the Effectiveness of Radio Liberation."

1. Your attention is particularly invited to the enclosed paper, which contains a wealth of closely-reasoned material of permanent value, prepared specifically for the use of Radio Liberation.

2. It will be noted that, for several reasons, very few directives for the content, tone and "line" of Radio Liberation have been issued. One of those reasons is that the American Committee cannot accept the charge that Radio Liberation is not a true emigre radio, and desires to continue to give the emigration, in one form or another, maximum freedom in determining those factors. Another reason involves final responsibility, which still remains in the hands of the Director, Radio Division, who has consequently been given as free a hand as possible. Still another reason is inherent in the many problems surrounding radio propaganda to the Soviet Union, whose solutions are never obvious, but which require continuous intensive thought and study without much possibility of factual data on audience reception. Part IV of the enclosure contains an outstandingly able discussion of what has often been one of the most controversial of these problems, which is the nature of the most desirable target.

3. There is general agreement that some sort of high level advisory body is desirable, apart from considerations of sponsorship or prestige, and this viewpoint is accepted by the Committee. Such a body would obviously involve other problems, not the least of which would be the selection and application of its advice by the Director, Radio Division. In the absence of such a body, your attention has been invited from time to time to what seem to be the most understanding and valuable viewpoints that have become available from a variety of sources, including those specially developed by the Committee to that end.

4. I have been impressed by the quality and insight of the material that has been thus accumulated, and, although the usefulness of a more formal advisory body remains unquestioned, am of the opinion that any mechanism would have to be very good indeed to improve upon such papers as that of Rzhnevsky in the Vestnik of the Munich Institute, that forwarded you under date of April 2, 1953, the series of papers by "Svidetel" (particularly No. 6 and its Supplement), the general viewpoints of "Commentator," and the paper which is enclosed herewith. Although some selection must obviously

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be exercised by the Director, Radio Division and his associates in applying all this material since it contains some conflicting advice, there is emerging a convincing and consistent pattern which, if now applied, should mark another great step forward in the development of Radio Liberation.

5. The means by which all this material is applied in practice can only be left to the Director, Radio Division. It is suggested that the normal way of doing so is to regularly set aside adequate time for its study and discussion. In any event, it is considered a matter of immediate and increasing priority. Although Radio Liberation is already widely regarded as a brilliant effort, it clearly stands in need of broad policy guidance. I regard this enclosure and the other papers mentioned in the preceding paragraph as major contributions towards this end, particularly in providing a sound, but unique and continuing foundation, as brilliant as the best productions that the radio has yet achieved, for what is expected to be a flexible and increasingly effective content and style. The series of "Analysis of Policy Trends Inside the USSR," although not phrased directly in propaganda terms, is on the same level and should be similarly studied and discussed.

L. C. Stevens
President

IMPROVING
THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF
RADIO LIBERATION

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IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RADIO LIBERATION

I - PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is to present criticism and practical suggestions which the American advisory personnel and emigre editorial staff of Radio Liberation can translate readily into more effective broadcasts. For this reason, the paper deliberately concentrates, as sharply as possible, on the shortcomings rather than the virtues of Radio Liberation programs to date.

Nothing that is said here should be construed as a value judgment of the over-all effort in Munich. In view of the external pressures and difficulties that have hampered the work of both the Americans and the emigre staff writers abroad, their accomplishments since the broadcasts began have been remarkable.

II - BASIC ASSUMPTION

I assume that the mission of Radio Liberation is not to conduct general anti-Communist propaganda for its own sake, but actually (within the limits of the feasible) to (a) undermine the strength and prestige of the Communist dictatorship in the Soviet Union; (b) reduce as much as possible the willingness of the Soviet Army to fight for that dictatorship; (c) give more articulate expression and greater cohesion to existing disaffection; (d) present realistic and attainable alternatives to the Communist dictatorship; and (e) encourage defection.

I have examined and discussed only the Russian broadcasts, but I think that most of the principles in this paper will be valid for non-Russian programs as well.

III - THE WEAK SIDE AT A GLANCE

Great improvement in content and form is necessary before critical Soviet listeners will be willing to believe that Radio Liberation is something more than an American-sponsored cold war venture and an instrument of American power politics. Many programs still sound, in whole or in part, as special pleading for American power-political objectives, or for emigre ambitions that can only be achieved with the aid of foreign military intervention. Apart from this basic fault, many programs still have the ring of hollow propaganda "in general", without being meaningfully related to the actual framework of experience of the Soviet Army and the peoples of the Soviet Union.

To a large extent, these faults can be corrected by a diligent application of a few basic principles. Many of these principles were clearly formulated in the paper entitled Notes on the Policy Content and Form of the Ideological Struggle against Bolshevism, forwarded to the Radio Advisor by the President of the American Committee on April 2, 1953. I have re-read

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this paper against the background of Radio Liberation's programs since that time, and I am convinced of the basic soundness of the paper. I recommend that all American advisory personnel and emigre writers study this document closely and apply it.

I think it useful to recall those passages whose implementation seems vital for any determined effort to improve Radio Liberation broadcasts. The author writes:

"Since the Soviet intelligentsia considers itself primarily 'Soviet', i.e., links itself with a certain system and objects to anything alien to this system, a propaganda campaign addressed to this intelligentsia (the term "intelligentsia" as used by the author includes army officers, technicians, engineers, managerial personnel, etc., in fact the vast bulk of the present and potential audience of Radio Liberation) should not be under the 'anti-Soviet' flag, and not even under the slogan of 'anti-Bolshevik struggle'. Many of them are proud of what they consider their 'heroic past' or their present 'achievements'.... Only with great caution and extreme tact would it become possible to set off the people against the vlast! The efforts are being made but unfortunately they lack tact and only offend the Soviet people... The Soviet people do not want to hear constantly that they are 'enslaved'.... The same tact should be applied when telling the Soviet people about their poverty, their lack of civilization, their squalid way of living...."

An examination of Radio Liberation's output will show that the above principles---whose basic soundness is recognized by most sober students of Soviet affairs---are violated at every turn. This is done both semantically, in the choice of language, and in the approach to specific issues. A broadcast not long ago which referred to the Soviet Union as a land of "two hundred million slaves" is but the most striking example. Over and over again, Radio Liberation uses sweeping negative slogans which do not clearly distinguish between the Communist Party ruling hierarchy and the rest of Soviet society. This is done in the apparent belief that sweeping "anti-Soviet" sloganeering constitutes effective anti-Communist propaganda. All research studies indicate the contrary.

The same paper pointed out with equal validity that:

"The Soviet man is weary of verbal labels, both of a positive and of a negative character. He is weary of all rubber stamps of propaganda. And he wants to be talked to at least seriously, in a business-like manner and with perfect dignity. And as an equal addressed by equals. Without sermonizing and without back-slapping. Without the language of the marketplace and without wisecracking."

Radio Liberation often offends on all of the above counts. It uses broad, vague verbal labels incessantly, in newscasts as well as in features. It employs rubber stamps and cliches every day ("bloody Communist tyranny", "our heroic army", "our great people", "our long-suffering motherland", etc., etc., ad nauseam).

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It often declaims and harangues instead of talking "seriously, in a businesslike manner and with perfect dignity." (Here the fault is often compounded by soap-opera production which inflates hollow rhetoric to still hollower proportions. This fault reached its height during two truly dramatic situations in the past few months, the East German revolt and the Beria purge. In the case of the East German revolt, Radio Liberation announcers tried to give a theatrical imitation of how a street agitator would have addressed Soviet troops had he stood among them. This made good soap opera, but very bad propaganda. This was precisely the time to analyze quite coldly for the Soviet occupation forces exactly what role they were playing in the suppression of the anti-Communist revolt. The best of Radio Liberation scripts during that period did just that, but the general effect was greatly weakened by the heavy admixture of soap opera and declamation. In the case of the Beria purge, the same error was repeated. Oratory and glee about the downfall of the "bloody hangman" Beria could well be regarded as effective pro-Malenkov propaganda, the last thing that Radio Liberation intended. Again, the result was to weaken greatly the impact of those scripts which coldly pointed out how little the peoples of the Soviet Union could expect from the elimination of Beria by men who were accomplices in all his crimes.)

Radio Liberation often does not speak to the audience "as an equal addressing equals." A script which tells Soviet listeners that while their zampolits are lecturing them on the Supreme Soviet, they would like to be out playing football or enjoying the fresh air, is really an insult to listeners who risk their freedom and perhaps their lives to know what Radio Liberation has to say about the impending session of the Supreme Soviet.

"Back-slapping" remains a common error in many programs. The listener doesn't really want to be told that he is a "hero". He knows very well that under present conditions, most heroes are dead heroes. A mature listener will regard most of Radio Liberation's compliments as a proof of insincerity.

Radio Liberation often descends to the language of the marketplace. It frequently substitutes in place of serious argument, name-calling which---far from being "hardhitting propaganda" (the favorite meaningless cliché of amateurs in this field)---actually suggests nothing so much as hysterical impotence.

As for wise-cracks, these have a limited place in occasional bits of sparkling satire, but they must be used sparingly and with great skill. Many Radio Liberation satiric programs are anything but sparkling and they are almost invariably too long to be effective. When satire goes beyond the short and snappy jab, it is self-defeating. It suggests that the station has nothing serious to say.

The April 2nd paper also pointed out correctly that "we must avoid the commonplaces, the constant milling around in one place. We should not speak about the Soviet system or regime in general, except perhaps in a strictly scientific and objective way, without 'lyrical' digressions and 'exclamations', beloved of our emigre publicists. We must talk about con-

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crete phenomena, events, persons, taking note of all the beats...of the pulse of Soviet life."

This obvious precept is also violated constantly. Program after program reverberates with the same empty thunder about the Soviet system in general. The fact that the ostensible source is a former Soviet officer in one case and an extract from an editorial in an emigre paper in another does not produce the intended cumulative effect. Zero multiplied by fifty remains zero.

Many otherwise excellent programs lose their strength because they are richly seasoned with time-consuming "lyrical digressions" and "exclamations" which, again, are an insult to the listener who risks his safety to hear what Radio Liberation has to say. At the chance of being somewhat unfair, I would say that nearly three-fourths of all Munich features contain some of this harmful verbal baggage. The elimination of all adjectives, verbal cadenzas and closing perorations would go a long way to correcting this fault. It would also save valuable time.

The actual "pulse of Soviet life" is often ignored in favor of the pounding pulse of the script-writer who, stimulated by his own pet hates and loves, generates in himself a pitch of ecstasy or indignation which the Soviet listener is not too likely to share. One New York script, for example, which calmly discussed the various intolerable restrictions that were imposed on Soviet occupation troops and pointed out that no such regulations exist in the British, French, American or other democratic army, was later seasoned with "no such godless conditions" prevail elsewhere. It is not unlikely that this touch produced laughter with some listeners. What purpose it was intended to serve is not clear to this writer. (For a good discussion of how little such rhetoric affects people behind the iron curtain, read Milosz's excellent book The Captive Mind).

The April 2nd paper is just as sound when it says that "anti-Bolshevik propaganda must be built not on the deductive (negation or recognition of the failure of Bolshevism as a whole--'anti-Bolshevism'), but on the inductive method, that is by means of proved and demonstrated worthlessness of separate entirely concrete phenomena of Soviet life---political, economic, etc. The Soviet people must themselves come to the conclusion (independent, not foisted on them from outside in a priori form) of the bankruptcy of the whole system in its entirety."

Although the above is obvious---no audience in the world wants to be given all the answers in predigested and question-begging form---a considerable part of Radio Liberation's output, and a great deal of its sloganeering terminology assumes the audience's ripe, complete and conscious revulsion against the Soviet system from top to bottom. This assumption is totally incompatible with the continued strength and staying power of the present regime and with the tapering off of defections in recent years. What is even worse, Radio Liberation's incessant use of such language and slogans, in programs and messages of substantially the same generalized content, makes it appear as if the station seriously believes that all-out, revolutionary opposition can actually be generated by repeating anti-Soviet

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incantations loudly and passionately enough. Such sound and fury truly signifies nothing. There is no reason why it should make converts. Furthermore, it offers nothing useful to the individual who already opposes the regime with all his heart and soul. It does not help him to know that emigres, safely beyond the reach of the MVD, are brave enough to call Malenkov names. What he wants to know is what is being done, and what can be done, in order to bring a better regime closer. And he wants to hear about this "seriously, in a businesslike manner, as an equal addressed by equals."

Any given day's output of Radio Liberation will show some examples of ineffectual--and often harmful--sloganeering, scattered through features and newscasts (where they belong even less). The American advisory personnel and the top emigre editorial staff in Munich are certainly qualified to spot all the faults that have been indicated above and to eliminate them. What is needed is the incisive use of the bluepencil for scripts that are otherwise sound (i.e. deal concretely with a situation or present a problem in a significant light) and the elimination, in their entirety, of scripts which offer nothing except "we're against Soviet sin", or "we're for country, for mother, for motherland." Radio Liberation has now broadcast enough scripts which are concrete, which deal inductively with specific issues, and which address the listener with respect as an equal, so that the standard can be applied in the future for all scripts.

I have commented at length on the April 2nd paper because the sound principles it contains come from a qualified Soviet scholar who, without having an axe to grind, seems to have anticipated many of the most serious faults which are present in actual Radio Liberation programs. The paper remains an excellent and compact handbook for the constant use of Radio Liberation. Naturally it does not supply all the answers. No paper can.

IV - THE REAL TARGET: THE "LOYAL" SOVIET CITIZEN

Eliminating useless rhetoric and propaganda "in general" merely cuts away dry rot, saves valuable time, shows respect for the listener and paves the way for better programs. What simple positive principle can actually give greater impact to Radio Liberation programs?

For working purposes, I think it can be reduced to this basic idea: The entire output should be such as to raise real doubts and questioning in the minds of listeners who believe themselves to be completely loyal to the present regime.

If Radio Liberation's output has this effect on stalwart supporters of the regime, it will inevitably have greater impact still on all other listeners. On the other hand, any program which "loyal" Soviet citizens and "Soviet patriots" can--within their set of values and their experience--laugh off or dismiss as of no consequence, has some inherent weakness in it.

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It seems to me that this principle is much better, for working purposes, than the hopeless search for who is completely sold on the status quo, who is beyond redemption, who is an opportunist, an idealist, a careerist, a vague malcontent, a disillusioned ex-believer, a conscious rebel, an inert victim, etc. Endless studies have been written on this subject without really answering the need of a radio station that will be heard either by chance or by habit, from sympathetic interest or hostile curiosity, by listeners whose degree of "loyalty" or "disloyalty" covers the entire political spectrum. By directing propaganda at the individual who, on the surface, seems like the hardest nut to crack, Radio Liberation hammers at the very foundations of the system. The advantage of this approach should be clear enough. In his Diary, Nazi Propaganda Minister Goebbels complained that too many German officials were on the restricted list that received transcripts of BBC broadcasts. He complained that many of these officials, despite the fact that they were relatively high-ranking members of the Nazi Party, weren't "intelligent" enough to have access to such propaganda. In other words he was afraid it would undermine their loyalty to the party dictatorship. This insight into the mentality of the ruling caste in a totalitarian society is very useful for Radio Liberation.

No one seriously doubts that even the firmest and most ruthless supporters of the Communist dictatorship have problems on their minds which don't exist for people of comparable standing in a normal society. No American general runs the risk of being shot for associating with an anti-Administration member of the Senate. No cabinet member goes to a concentration camp for differing with the President on the Taft-Hartley Act. Yet precisely such risks, and a thousand more, affect every high-ranking member of Soviet society. In fact, his life expectancy is lower than that of an ordinary worker or peasant. For this obvious reason, if for no other, there is a great deal which Radio Liberation can--and should--say that is of direct concern to the most "loyal" Soviet officer or civilian and the most ardent "Soviet patriot." If such an individual is of good, normal intelligence (and those in the higher echelons of military and civilian power are at least that), the convincing portrait of a society without the hazards that exist under the Communist dictatorship, attainable without suicide, must have some effect on his thinking. That is putting the issue in the narrowest possible terms, without trying to guess how many Soviet officers and generals, factory directors and scientists, would like to see a more civilized, humane government for broader reasons than protecting their own hides. To gear all Radio Liberation broadcasts so that such persons will at least take them seriously is, therefore, to reach those with the greatest power to do something about the present regime. This is also the category most likely to possess radio receivers powerful enough to hear Radio Liberation, and to enjoy the privacy to listen without being detected and reported to the MVD.

What does the application of the principle of keeping all Radio Liberation broadcasts sufficiently adult to interest the Soviet loyalist, the "beneficiary of the regime", if you will, mean in practice? Negatively, as already indicated, it means avoiding all generalized "anti-Soviet" sloganeering, which in any case does not help the clearly disaffected either. It also means avoiding all special pleading for America and the

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West. (This is also bad propaganda for any audience in the Soviet Union. An individual may detest the Communist Party dictatorship and still reject foreign tutelage or the suggestion that foreign governments are always guided by noble, disinterested motives.)

Positively, this principle means discussing every issue in such terms as will compel the ostensible Soviet stalwart and "Soviet patriot" at the very least to grapple in his own mind with what Radio Liberation has said. Such an internal debate, within the framework of personal experience, is the first step on the road to independent political thought. Independent thought is the start of disloyalty to the dictatorship, the start of the search for an attainable alternative.

Does gearing programs to this audience--the one with the best listening facilities and the greatest capacity for political action--mean "high-brow" or "scientific" broadcasts which are beyond the mental capacity of the ordinary soldier or worker who may be listening? Does it mean neglecting the interests of the common people in favor of the interests of the elite? Certainly not. The best programs of Radio Liberation during the past few months, that is, the most sensible and thought-provoking ones, are of equal interest to the general and the private, the factory director and the worker, the MVD official and his potential victim. It is not necessary to be Machiavellian or "clever" to accomplish this. On the contrary, the prerequisites are straightforward, simple seriousness and an equal respect for the mentality and feelings of all possible listeners, high and low.

Concretely, what can Radio Liberation tell a Soviet listener who thinks Malenkov is doing a fine job? A great deal. Consider the impact of Malenkov's speech before the Supreme Soviet last August. The Soviet general or official who listens to Radio Liberation by accident, out of amused boredom, or because it is his job to follow "enemy propaganda", may genuinely believe that Malenkov's speech was a masterful analysis of the internal and international situation. One reason he thinks so is that Malenkov skillfully juggled facts, so skillfully that most of the deceit escaped the Soviet loyalist's attention. This is not because this Soviet listener is less intelligent than the Radio Liberation commentator. It is simply that he doesn't have access to the information that is necessary in order to see the gaping holes in Malenkov's argument. When these facts are soberly and convincingly presented to him by Radio Liberation, he is no longer quite as impressed with the speech. Thus, for example, when Malenkov argues that the Party leadership was right, and the Rykov-Bukharin Opposition wrong, when the former junked the relative liberalism of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in favor of the successive heavy-industry Five-Year Plans, the Soviet loyalist may nod his head in approval. He would approve less wholeheartedly, however, after hearing in detail how real wages declined as a result of the Party leadership's program. He is not aware, in detail, of the extent to which real wages are still below the NEP high level. About this he hears nothing from Malenkov and in the Soviet press. But this Radio Liberation is in a position to do simply and clearly, by a factual summary of the findings of independent economists on the subject. When the Soviet loyalist gets these facts, he is no longer

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quite so sure that Malenkov was frank in his discussion of the present problem of living standards in the Soviet Union. This doubt would mark his first step on the road to independent thought, to opposition. Examples of this kind can be multiplied ad infinitum. The Malenkov speech alone provided material for a dozen solid, sober scripts which do nothing except dissect the elements of dishonesty in that important document. The cumulative effect of a dozen such short, factual analyses--and Radio Liberation did carry several--is to reduce the Premier's speech from a paper of apparent frankness to the sly special pleading of a Stalin-trained politician who has a great deal to conceal. The fact that the Soviet government promptly published five million copies of the speech for large-scale indoctrination purposes indicates how important such Radio Liberation surgery is. To stay on the side of pessimism, let us even assume that some Soviet officials, after listening to Radio Liberation's sober dissection, will still conclude that Malenkov is very clever to pull so many rabbits out of his hat. What of it? That is considerably less than Malenkov wants his Soviet audience to believe of him. As for that large part of the audience which was genuinely impressed with Malenkov's "sincere" admission that things were not in good shape in the Soviet Union, such adult Radio Liberation propaganda will leave their initial faith somewhat undermined. And this would constitute a genuine accomplishment in the direction of undermining the prestige of the dictatorship. Thus, although each individual script is too quiet and sober for the sound and fury school of propaganda, the cumulative effect---when combined with incessant hammering along similar lines in other programs---may be to generate actual anti-Malenkov fury in the minds of the audience, the only place such fury does any concrete good.

The same principle of hammering at the mind of the Soviet loyalist, no matter how highly placed, will pay off in every sphere of Soviet life, on every subject, and in every purposeful inductive attack on the foundations of the Communist dictatorship. Let us take the example of religion. In his own mind, the Party official who listens to Radio Liberation may agree with the official doctrine that "religion is the opium of the people." He may think that the survival of the Greek Orthodox Church is a necessary concession to the residue of "superstition" in the minds of "backward" elements in the population. He may look on the priest as a relic of the pre-Soviet order, who worked with the landowner to keep the peasants submerged in dark ignorance and fear. Furthermore, as we know from the testimony of escapees, many Soviet citizens regard the priest of today as an MVD man in disguise and equate such priests with religion in general. To tell such listeners, as Radio Liberation did in a script entitled "The Baptism of Old Russia," that back in 965 A.D. Prince Vladimir selected the "right" religion when he chose Orthodoxy (a singularly bigoted, irreligious statement), is to reinforce such listeners in the belief that Radio Liberation lives in the past and speaks for a dead society.

Does it follow that Radio Liberation has no valid religious message for the Soviet loyalist who calls himself a "non-believer?" Not at all. Even in a free society, church attendance is no sure barometer of a man's deeper beliefs. A church-goer may be merely a social conformist, and one who stays at home may be profoundly religious. In Soviet society, the gulf

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between what a man appears on the surface, or calls himself, and what he is in fact goes much deeper. This suppressed religious feeling, coupled with indifference or hostility to the established church, has been noted by many foreign correspondents and diplomats in Moscow. What better example of this dichotomy than the case of Yuri Korolkov, lifelong Communist and Pravda correspondent in Berlin, who after proclaiming himself an atheist, stated under the influence of provocative questioning and several drinks, that "God is in the human heart"---as fervent a statement of religious faith as any man has ever made. (See The Choice).

How can Radio Liberation translate this inner conflict in the minds of non-church-going Soviet loyalists into effective broadcasts? How can it convince such men that they have higher moral obligations than those imposed by the Party dictatorship? Obviously by distinguishing between the trappings of religion and its substance, which reminds people, over and again, that the state cannot be the final arbiter in matters of conscience, in the choice between good and evil, in the problems of the human heart. This type of religious message, as distinguished from the stereotype, is already being delivered by Radio Liberation in its Sunday Talks and in some of Bishop John's messages to the Soviet Army. The least that such broadcasts do is to remove the sneer from the face of the Soviet loyalist who calls himself a non-believer, without necessarily knowing what he means. At the same time, such scripts provide moral sustenance to all listeners and undermine, to some slight extent at least, the authority of the regime which denies these universal moral values. If Radio Liberation tries to do "more", it does less in fact. Apart from all other considerations, a jammed radio station cannot capture the beauty and majesty of Greek Orthodox services so as to gratify those many listeners who, under normal conditions, might be stirred by such programs. And if, as one great American revolutionary said, "resistance to tyranny is obedience to God," then informal religious programs such as the Sunday Talks are more likely to promote both "resistance to tyranny" and "obedience to God" than official sermons which an important part of the Soviet audience will reject because of carefully planted prejudices.

Addressing one's self to the Soviet "loyalist" and "patriot" pays the largest dividends no matter what problem is discussed. Consider how Radio Liberation should deal with the lessons of World War II. Last July a broadcast stated that but for "generous" American lend-lease, the Soviet Union would have been defeated. This sort of statement is ideally suited to antagonize most listeners, particularly the military who presumably make up the bulk of the present audience.

In the first place, the Soviet officer has a ready and--from his standpoint--complete, answer to this statement. He will say angrily that while America supplied tanks and guns, Russia shed torrents of blood. He knows that Russian losses in World War II were many times higher than American losses. He can tell himself that lend-lease was a cheap enough contribution in a common struggle, against a common enemy, which bled his country white. Does this mean that there aren't many facts about World War II which, if properly presented, would interest any "Soviet patriot?"

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Of course not. This is one of the most rewarding fields for sober anti-Kremlin propaganda, within a framework which most deeply concerns the Soviet general, officer and soldier. The Soviet government tells him nothing about the costly political and military blunders of the Party leadership, blunders that were primarily responsible for the enormous losses of the Soviet Army and civilian population. Again, whether such evidence undermines confidence in the Communist dictatorship or merely produces contempt for Radio Liberation, depends on whether it is presented soberly, factually and calmly--as Radio Liberation has done on several occasions--or whether instead the information is inaccurate, coated with emotional declamation, and so presented as to offend elementary patriotic feelings. Any Radio Liberation broadcast that deals with the lessons of World War II or the dangers of World War III in such a manner as to produce no impression on a Soviet general or, worse still, persuade him that Radio Liberation is talking through its hat, represents a lost opportunity to influence the minds of men near the top level of the Soviet power structure. Nor does inaccuracy and declamation help the ordinary soldier. He too would prefer the straight goods.

V - SENSE VERSUS SOUND AND FURY

A major fault of all generalized "anti-Soviet" propaganda--as distinguished from sensible discourse on concrete problems which the Communist dictatorship is incapable of solving--is that it uses violent, emotional language. Over Radio Liberation we still hear a great deal of "overthrowing", "destroying", "the day of reckoning", "bloodily", "godless", etc. The few Soviet listeners who are simple-minded enough to take this language seriously will conclude that the station is staffed by desperados who don't care how much suffering they inflict on the peoples of the Soviet Union in the pursuit of their objectives. Most listeners, particularly those who actually own short-wave radio sets powerful enough to hear Radio Liberation, will recognize this to be the classical language of political impotence. Just as they will recognize the Radio Liberation statement that Major Klimov of the Association of Post-War Escapees was greeted in Berlin with "thunderous applause" as provincial emigre mimicry of Radio Moscow's bombast.

The average person, whether a common laborer or a factory director, senses that people who are confident of the coming triumph of their cause don't need violent, apocalyptic language to make their point. And Soviet listeners know, from their own experience, that when the Soviet regime is least sure of itself, it also rants and thunders, and greets itself with "thunderous applause." On the other hand, when the Soviet government has solid material to work with, it speaks as calmly as BBC, even "objectively." For example, when it reports that 2,000,000 French workers are on strike, or that de Gasperi was forced to resign, or that a British conservative newspaper has criticized American foreign policy.

The principle is plain enough. No adult is impressed with Radio Liberation sound and fury, whether in the text of a script or in the theatrical delivery of an excited announcer. He can be impressed only by

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arguments and facts which make real sense within his framework of experience. And the less heat that is used in the presentation of such arguments and facts, the more light they are likely to produce in the minds and hearts of the listeners. The Soviet listener gets enough thunder from Radio Moscow. Besides, behind the thunder of Soviet propaganda stands the technological and military might of the party-state. Behind Radio Liberation, on the other hand, stands only the power that ideas can exercise over the minds of its listeners. Therefore, thunder over Radio Liberation is merely ludicrous. It is the last thing in the world that the sympathetic listener, who regards Radio Liberation as a friend, wants from the station.

I am aware that some Soviet emigres believe that Radio Liberation should imitate Communist sound and fury. Here, too, the Soviet emigre who wrote the April 2nd paper presents what seems the conclusive answer.

"Emigrants," he writes, "are not always good advisors. Former Soviet people, especially, have developed a mimicry, and together with it, a fear of being suspected of pro-Soviet sympathies, and accused of that very Bolshevism under which they suffered and from which they fled. And in their mimicry and in their fear, they don't always say what they think, but more often that which in their opinion they think people want to hear them say."

Clearly these fears are no guide for Radio Liberation. The same problem of language in broadcasts to the Soviet public was discussed with Professor Isaiah Berlin at Oxford last February. Professor Berlin, who headed British Information in the United States during World War II and served with the British Embassy in Moscow after the war, is Russian-born and speaks Russian fluently. Here is what he said, on the basis of his experience with Soviet Russian officials in Moscow in 1945:

"Talk to Soviet listeners in exactly the same way as you would talk to any sensible person. What genuinely interests you, is likely to interest them. The propaganda that bores you, is just as likely to bore them. The worst thing you can do is to imitate Soviet propaganda style. An imitation that is 95 per cent perfect is still ludicrous to the listener. Give your Soviet listener forbidden fruit, the things he wants to hear about, but doesn't get. Talk to him as an equal, and you'll hold his interest." Properly applied, Professor Berlin's brief remarks are themselves a first-class propaganda manual. It can be reduced to this: Don't kid the public.

Radio Liberation still does far too much mimicry of Soviet hot air. This is particularly true in some scripts by Soviet emigres, both in New York and Munich, who often seem to possess no other language and no other ideas except those which originate in the arsenal of the Soviet enemy. (Incidentally, this fault is quite common in free-lance contributions to the Russian desk of the Voice of America as well). The louder such Soviet emigres thunder against the dictatorship, the stronger their invective and would-be irony, the more they make the Communist dictatorship seem invulnerable. If invective is strong enough, it sounds like the unconscious idolatry that it is in fact.

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This psychological error--which comes from continuing to live within the Bolshevik twilight world, long after escaping physically from the Soviet Union---is one which pre-Bolshevik Russian men of letters never make. Conscientious Soviet emigres can be cured of this bad habit by the persistent, patient efforts of their older Russian colleagues and by American advisory personnel. Radio Liberation is fortunate enough to have in Munich several Russian writers of this calibre and it has Americans who are equal to the job, if they put their minds to it. This does not mean using archaic turns of speech of pre-Soviet Russia. Here, in turn, Soviet emigres have an educational job to do. In a number of cases, this type of close collaboration between pre-Soviet Russian writers and postwar Soviet escapees has already paid good dividends. The collaboration between Gazdanoff and Orshansky on the Major Matveyev series is one example. Here the speech is modern, but the ideas are not imprisoned within the Soviet twilight world in which the leadership of the Communist Party seems like God Almighty.

This problem of benefiting from the twilight vision of recent escapees, while presenting the clear sky and the sunlight beyond to the listeners of Radio Liberation is one which the American advisory personnel and the editorial staff in Munich must face at all times. To surrender, even partially, to the thinking of the Bolshevik-minded anti-Bolsheviks, is only to produce propaganda which will turn the stomachs of Soviet listeners who are anxious to hear something fresh, promising and sensible from Radio Liberation.

VI - LENGTH OF SCRIPTS

Many Radio Liberation scripts are still too long. There are many sound reasons for brevity. The most compelling is that Soviet jamming is so powerful that the main point of a drawn-out argument is not likely to register with the listener. He will catch disconnected snatches and frills, but will probably leave his receiver without knowing what Radio Liberation was trying to say. (This we know from listening to actual Radio Liberation broadcasts, as monitored through jamming in Berlin). A second important reason is the element of risk. The listener may be forced to turn off his set at any given moment. If he has listened for only three or four minutes, it is well that this brief period offer him something complete, informative and intelligible. A third good reason is that by insisting on short scripts, bombast and "lyricism" (i.e. hot air) is necessarily eliminated. If the script writer is compelled to make his point in 300, 400 or 500 words, he has little margin for useless rhetoric. Finally, if the program consists of short features only, the listener gets a more varied diet. At present, in accordance with Gresham's law, inflated bad scripts drive many hard-currency good scripts out of circulation. A five or six minute program, which could have made its point more clearly in half that time, is enough to keep two or three good features off the air.

No script can be too short. If it makes its point, it has said all it should. If it has two important points to make, it should be broken up into two independent scripts. If a single feature tries to put across two ideas, neither is likely to register clearly, because of jamming and because

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each idea detracts from the attention the other deserves. Moreover, we do not know at what point the listener may be compelled to switch off.

A three-minute script can still be two minutes too long. This is particularly true of satire. The best Oktiabrev features would all have benefited by cutting to two-thirds or half their length. Intelligent, sharp editing by a fresh eye, not the author's, is essential for effective satire, the most difficult radio form. On this principle, the Elagin satiric poems are now only a fraction of their earlier length. They are much better as a result.

Virtually all Munich scripts would benefit by following New York's experience in this respect. The Akhminov commentaries, for example, are almost always too long and too complicated, making it difficult—even when reading them—to grasp the basic point. Cutting these commentaries down to their bone would increase their value and would force the author to think through his ideas more clearly. The same holds even for such a good feature as the Gazdanoff-Orshansky Major Matveyev series. These often quote unnecessarily long extracts from Soviet propaganda, instead of the exact point they refute, and repeat too many anti-Communist clichés. The effect is to weaken the impact of the fresh idea which is generally present.

At the New York end, we have been working consistently to cut scripts down to the minimum needed for effectiveness. The What to Do series, originally several typewritten pages long, are now seldom more than one short paragraph. The Panin series is generally down to 250-300 words, sometimes shorter. Both features are better as a result. New York commentaries now seldom go beyond three and a half minutes, compared to five or more earlier. Letters to the Homeland must be slightly longer because they require introducing the author—which is half the point, in some cases—and telling something of his story. Even these, however, average only about four minutes, compared to six and seven minutes a few months ago. The Sunday Talks have likewise been cut to half or one-third of their original length, when the series started. Missing Pages demonstrates that even the story of a suppressed book, with pertinent extracts, can be packed into a four and a fraction minute feature. The same technique keeps How They Were Cured of Communism down to minimum length. When necessary, two independent features, or even more, provide assurance that nothing vital is lost.

Munich has not gone nearly far enough in this direction. The answer is much closer collaboration between writers and editors. The author who sits off in a corner alone is never a good judge of what is valuable and what is superfluous in his copy.

The goal, obviously, is to make every minute of Radio Liberation count. The Soviet listener must feel that no matter when he tunes in, his precious—and often precarious—time is not wasted. He must never feel that he has been exposed to unnecessary risk in order to listen to copy that belonged in the wastepaper basket, not on the air. Without clearly defined editorial responsibility, however, this objective cannot be reached.

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VII - NEWS

Here the road to quick improvement is short and clearly defined. News should be straightforward, brisk and objective. All comment and color words should be eliminated. Editorial skill should go into the selection of the news, but the items themselves must be presented in a completely objective manner. Otherwise it isn't a newscast. In content, the news has improved enormously in recent months, and good judgment in the selection of material has been shown generally. But this progress has been vitiated in part by the choice of language and by emphasis which make it all too obvious to any listener that he is not getting news, but rather that news items are used as a vehicle for indoctrination. There is no valid reason for this. The Soviet listener knows the difference between news and commentary and the two should not be served on the same platter.

Another fault is that the news generally uses the language of American psychological warfare and presents what is obviously the official American (or Western) viewpoint. This is true both semantically--the language is often indistinguishable from the Voice of America or BBC---and in the priority given to items that originate in the office of the U. S. Secretary of State or other Western official. There is no reason why Radio Liberation should duplicate either the Voice of America or BBC in its presentation of the news.

News can be greatly improved by drastically cutting down on statements by Western officials and by increasing the proportion of information that deals with events in the world. Much more news from behind the iron curtain, of direct interest to the Soviet Army and the Soviet audience in general, could be obtained by closer liaison with Radio Free Europe. When such items, having a direct bearing on the struggle of peoples behind the iron curtain against Communist dictatorship, are presented over Radio Liberation, they should be worded in a manner that arouses the interest, not the resentment, of Soviet listeners. Telling the Soviet Army, for example, that "the Soviet empire" is crumbling is bad semantics. It is possible to interest them in the fight of Czechs, Poles and others for their democratic rights and independence without holding before their eyes, as Radio Liberation has sometimes done, the image of a catastrophe for the Soviet Union. A little common sense will solve this semantic problem.

The excessive time devoted to diplomatic talks, the progress of the Korean conference, and other tedious details of the cold war is another fault that should be remedied. Perhaps it is the job of the Voice of America to give the Soviet audience all the details on this (although I doubt it). It certainly isn't the job of Radio Liberation. The same goes for the hackneyed device of "diplomatic sources believe." Radio Liberation is not a government mouthpiece and there is no reason for it to feed the public such thin stuff.

Much more factual information on strikes in Germany, Poland, agricultural unrest in East Europe, the activities of such organizations as the ICFTU, the Cultural Congress, Fighters Against Inhumanity, etc., is needed. But here, too, Radio Liberation newscasts should report what these organizations are actually doing in the fight against Communism, and omit a large part of their manifestos on what they intend to do, or what they would like to do. In every case when such items have been treated in a factual objective way they have made for good newscasts. The same principle holds for what the West is doing in the fight against Communism. Actual deeds, not lofty statements, make interesting news.

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As far as American news is concerned, it is well to lean over backward not to give this too much prominence, for the simple reason that the listener in any event suspects that Radio Liberation is an American cold war mouthpiece. If this principle is followed, hard news of important American action will have much more impact than at present, when nearly every statement by an important American official is given top billing. On the other hand, the purposeful selection of items from Swiss, French, British and other European newspapers, presented without editorial comment, has made for excellent Radio Liberation newscasts. There can be more of this to good advantage.

The actual impact of newscasts would benefit not only by eliminating color words, but by shorter sentences, cutting out the argumentative tone, and by the elimination of all rhetorical questions and propaganda slogans. Radio Liberation news should aim for the language and spirit that a free, democratic newspaper, published in Moscow, would use if such a paper existed and had access to all news sources.

The news should also steer clear of such usages as "the Great Powers", "the Eastern Bloc", "the Western Powers" and all other terminology of power politics and cold war. Such usage tends to equate all regimes and all blocs. It is a simple matter to say, instead, "Great Britain, France and the United States" did so and so. This should be done without pomp, as befits a station that addresses a people over the heads of their government.

Exaggeration and the reporting of improbable rumors as actual news are other faults that crop up in all anti-Communist radio enterprises, including Radio Liberation. Not so long ago, Radio Free Europe had its fingers burned by giving a big play to unconfirmed accounts of large-scale disturbances in Poland. This gave the Moscow and Warsaw radios a golden opportunity for effective counter-propaganda, built around the theme that Radio Free Europe lived in a dream world of wishful thinking. This boner also took some of the broad psychological impact out of the actual revolt of the East German workers. Inasmuch as Radio Liberation must always fight for the confidence and trust of its audience, it is sound to stay on the sober side of the news at all times. (We know from escapees that Soviet listeners distrust every propaganda source, their own and foreign. In fact, "he lies like the radio" is a popular Soviet saying). For this obvious reason, Radio Liberation will build up greater confidence by understatement than by exaggeration. If the listener is finally convinced that Radio Liberation, never exaggerates, he will be far more receptive to what the station has to say, in its commentaries as well as in the news. Puffing up minor events far beyond their actual significance is another aspect of the same propaganda error. In newscasts, at least, the dictum "when in doubt, leave it out" seems a good one to follow.

Needless to say, Radio Liberation should discontinue the practice, in newscasts, of showing either elation or dissatisfaction with the news. Nor should it say, as it has, "as the Daily Telegraph correctly states." If the news editor doesn't think the Daily Telegraph item speaks for itself, he shouldn't use it. He can't improve on it by such editorial comment. This merely discredits the news program.

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Finally, the effect of overtly slanted news, interlarded with editorial comment and slogans, is to dilute the impact of other features and commentaries. The result is an unbalanced, undifferentiated diet. Five minutes of brisk, objective news, carefully selected, will make a much better news program. On days when there are momentous developments, this period can be extended, but the principle of well selected straight news, without comment, should still be observed.

VIII - SINCERITY AND "WARMTH"

Some advocates of emotional language, soap opera production and invective believe that without such devices the station would be lacking in "warmth" and that it would be difficult for the audience to identify themselves with it. Enough has already been said on the general subject of bombast, and how it produces the opposite of its intended effect. As has been already pointed out, some Soviet emigres talk in these terms because they are hypnotized by the facade of Soviet power. But the same bad advice sometimes comes from Americans who confuse American commercial advertising, for the American public, with the problems of a radio station whose "customers" risk their careers and their freedom to listen. The best way I can deal with this confusion of American advertising and American public relations with propaganda beamed to a police state, is by a concrete example from my own experience. As an inveterate Yankee fan, I often listen to Mel Allen's broadcasts from the Yankee Stadium. These are sponsored by Ballantine. I have heard Mel Allen say "Ask the man for a Ballantine" so often, that I buy Ballantine beer. I pretend to believe that Ballantine tastes better. In a blindfold test, I probably couldn't pick it out from any other beer of about the same content. But I am, of course, a willing victim, aware that I am being taken in, and also aware that Ballantine is no worse than another beer that sells for the same price. And so I get an additional glow out of Ballantine, a voluntary accomplice in the great game of American advertising. On the other hand, if I were starving to death and I had to choose between Ballantine and another beer that contained greater food value, or between Ballantine and a half pound of beef, I wouldn't pay any attention to Mel Allen. The Soviet listener cannot afford to play the games that are a normal and innocuous part of life in a free society. He can't be "sold" by Radio Liberation huckstering. Far from considering verbal and production devices that try to create the illusion of warmth and intimacy as proof that Radio Liberation is "his" station, such devices antagonize him. To him they are evidence that the station is not very sincere and doesn't really take him seriously. (Milosz's book The Captive Mind shows clearly how super-sensitive people in a police state have become toward any kind of Western "shallowness" of this variety).

How, then, does one achieve "warmth"? Very simply. By speaking in honest, frank and straightforward terms, without pose or affectation, as one actually talks to a personal friend. Between friends, there should be neither flatterer nor insinuation. The Soviet public gets all the sugar-coated lies, the cynical flattery and the exaggerated compliments in the world from its despots, big and small. It senses that such devices are em-

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played for selfish and cynical reasons. Nothing can come as a more refreshing contrast than the voice of a true friend who does none of these things, who is always honest and above-board. No Radio Liberation listener would feel anything except pleasant surprise if, for example, he heard the station admit from time to time that it had made a mistake. If it should, for example, "In our broadcast the other day, we incorrectly stated that the Minister of Internal Affairs Kruglov was formerly chief of Smersh. That statement was incorrect. We are sorry we made that mistake." Such statements, unless themselves used archly and "cleverly," help build up confidence in the station.

True "warmth", like true affection can't be manufactured out of empty words. It comes only by a constant attitude which convinces the listener that he is dealing with a real friend. Excessive flattery, suppression of significant information on the theory that the listener isn't intelligent enough to receive it, undue familiarity, slanting information for immediate tactical gains (which almost always backfires in the long run)--these are all means for creating a chasm rather than a bridge between the station and the audience. Radio Liberation has made such mistakes on a number of occasions. For example, one New York script said that "most field commanders of the Soviet Army are members of the Communist Party." At the Munich end, the word "most" was changed to read "many." What was accomplished by this fraud? At the last Party Congress, Marshal Bulganin reported that 86.4 per cent of such officers were members of the Communist Party or the Young Communist League. Radio Liberation's primary audience--the military--is well aware that "most"--not "many"--officers are in the party. The broadcast thus suggests to the audience that Radio Liberation doesn't know much about the composition of the Soviet Army, or that it is trying to be arch. Presumably, the change was made in the interests of "better" propaganda, to make non-Communists feel better. Actually, it undermines the authority of the station.

Radio Liberation has also shown itself to be unduly coy with respect to the most obvious unpleasant facts about the chauvinistic policy of the Communist dictatorship, apparently on the theory that this establishes a warmer bond with Russian listeners than frankness can. For example, Peter Pirogov wrote in a script that the Soviet Army was being compelled to play the role of "gendarme of Europe", just as it had under Nicholas I. His script was in connection with the revolts and unrest in the satellites. The reference to Nicholas I was deleted, presumably not to offend the memory of that monarch, whom all Russian historians recognize to have been a true reactionary. Whose feelings did Radio Liberation spare by this deletion? Certainly not those of the average Soviet officer, who has also been taught that Nicholas I was a reactionary. The only effect was to deprive the term "gendarme of Europe" of the historical connotation which would have made immediate sense to the listener, and would have suggested to him that the present dictatorship was following in the footsteps of a reactionary ruler whom even Soviet textbooks criticize.

On the same principle of avoiding frank talk about the dictatorship's attempt to exploit Russian patriotism for ends which in the long run harm the Russian people, no use was made of a script which discussed

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how Stalin's synthetic (kvass) patriotism had backfired and caused discontent in the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union. A real friend can speak frankly about such things. Radio Liberation certainly should in its Russian broadcasts. It should not have such a patronizing attitude toward Russian listeners to believe that they aren't mature enough to think about these matters. Moreover, by talking about such matters frankly and honestly in Russian broadcasts, an example of tolerance and understanding of the genuine aspirations of non-Russian peoples is demonstrated. Such an attitude can only be helpful in bridging antagonisms between Russians and non-Russians. It is unfair to the Russian public to believe that they are pleased with the abuse of Russian traditions and Russia's cultural heritage for purposes of brow-beating and oppressing other nations and peoples.

A final example along the same lines: In a script entitled "Decay Begins on Top", written shortly after the Beria purge, it was pointed out that many actions of the Soviet dictatorship show manifestations of irrationality that are characteristic of all decadent and destruction-bound systems. The audience was reminded that Rasputin was one such symbol of the impending downfall of Tsarism. The reference to Rasputin was deleted, although it was a meaningful and vivid analogy, again on the apparent theory that some monarchists wouldn't like it. That makes no sense whatsoever, particularly when one recalls that Rasputin was as much detested by many members of the Imperial Court as by members of the Duma.

The excessive use of the form "dear friends" seems like another example of unwarranted familiarity which is more likely to produce resentment than "warmth". The form may be good for the Matveyev series, which is written genuinely in that spirit. It may also be proper in some Letters to the Homeland when the author is speaking to his actual, personal friends. It doesn't belong in general to commentaries and messages. When used in this manner, it is likely to produce this negative reaction: "Who says you're a friend?" The rule can, perhaps, be formulated in these terms: Don't talk to the audience in a manner that you wouldn't want people to talk to you. Real warmth will come from playing square with the listener at all times. This plus the regular featuring of actual Soviet emigres on Radio Liberation, and dealing with problems that genuinely concern the listener will produce both "warmth" and light. Skip the hearts and flowers.

A word about the use of music to achieve "warmth" and "atmosphere." This is another device of very little value. In the pre-broadcast stage, we experimented with musical introductions. They seemed good in theory. In the light of experience, however, plus the fact that jamming wrecks music, the use of music is all but worthless. In the case of serious scripts, it actually injects a note of insincerity. This was very pronounced in the case of one of Bishop John's messages to the Soviet Army. It is bad, for the same reason, in the Sunday Talk, although experimentally it seemed like a good idea. These programs should be allowed to stand on what they have to say. In their simplicity lies whatever strength they have. Music in very small quantities may be effective with satire. Otherwise, its complete elimination will help to make Radio Liberation sound more sincere.

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IX - THE USE OF DEFECTORS

New defectors are, of course, a star attraction for Radio Liberation. But they must be used properly. The talk by Major Ronzhin on July 24th was a classical example of what not to do with a new Soviet escapee. Here was a man who was still in the Soviet army at the time of Stalin's death. Instead of talking with his fellow-officers behind the iron curtain about actual conditions in that army, as he knew them, how his unit reacted to Stalin's death, how the zampolits dealt with it, what the soldiers and officers in his unit said privately, etc., Major Ronzhin delivered a tedious political discourse which sounded as though it had been written by someone who had worked on an emigre paper for years. He said nothing that indicated that he was a man fresh out of the Soviet Army. His talk ranged from the Kronstadt revolt of 1921 to "the veritable slaughter for occupation of the throne" in the Kremlin. This should never be repeated. New escapees should discuss the concrete things they know better than anyone in the West, and leave the theory to theoreticians, of whom there are very few. The same principle holds for older escapees as well. Too many of them have mastered the propaganda cliches of the political emigration and no longer speak to their fellow-countrymen at all. Neither as individuals nor as a group (or groups) should they engage in generalized harangues. They should speak soberly, on specific concrete issues. Such broadcasts, if they present something fresh each time, will always interest the audience.

X - ACCENTUATING THE POSITIVE AND DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION

Assuming that in the weeks and months ahead, the shortcomings discussed in I-IX supra are corrected, Radio Liberation must still develop more positive content than is evident in present programs. This is as much a challenge to the New York Program Section as it is to Munich. It is not enough to wage even the most skillful campaign to undermine the prestige of the Communist dictatorship. Mere destructive criticism, however convincingly presented, can have a bad cumulative effect. It can suggest that only continued tyranny or new catastrophe lies ahead. From the testimony of many escapees, we know that a major barrier to positive political thought in the Soviet Army and population is the fear that any basic change in the country must be of a catastrophic character, accompanied by new bloodbaths, civil war, starvation, and perhaps new despotism. It is therefore necessary, at all times, to hold before the minds of the audience the image of a better, more humane society attainable without external or internal catastrophe.

The way to begin is to turn away from the idea, as well as the language, which suggests that an apocalyptic, blood-soaked climax to the present era in Russian history is inevitable. That means honestly believing, as well as saying, that neither an atomic-hydrogen world conflict nor a bloody civil war is inevitable for the Soviet Union. It means recognizing that other alternatives exist, alternatives that lie within the capacity of the Soviet Army and population. It means recognizing that there is no preordained road to civilized, responsible, representative government in Russia.

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To translate this into better programs means to think and talk always in terms of positive objectives, positive goals, goals that go hand in hand with a democratic society. "Anti-Bolshevism" without positive democratic objectives is either no viewpoint at all, or it is a warmed-over version of the totalitarian "Anti-Bolshevism" which Hitler tried to impose on Western Europe and Russia. Moreover, the "Anti-Bolshevism" of the chauvinist fringe of the Russian emigration cannot help to bring about a common front of Russians and non-Russians in the Soviet Union in the struggle for a better society. For the alternative this brand of propaganda suggests to the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union is in no way more acceptable to them than the present Communist dictatorship.

Democratic education, in the broadest and deepest sense of the word, is the sole common denominator for uniting all who desire a more civilized order. It opens new vistas to the thoughtful "Soviet patriot" no less than to the conscious rebel who cannot visualize a constructive future. It suggests to Russians and non-Russians alike those broad areas for common effort and understanding that are indispensable in the future, no matter what that future holds in store.

Here there is a partial exception to the general injunction against slogans. The repeated suggestion by Radio Liberation that "only a government of freely elected representatives of the people can meet the needs of the country" is a positive and constructive idea to fix in the minds of the audience. It contains nothing that repels either the "Soviet patriot" or the rebel. But this idea should not itself degenerate to a cliché. It should be given content, day by day, through concrete examples in terms of every aspect of Soviet life. Radio Liberation should show why Soviet workers need free trade unions; why all citizens will benefit if peasants can choose their own form of land tenure (whether the individual farm or the voluntary cooperative); why the Soviet scientist needs a much broader freedom of inquiry and research than he now has; why factory managers must have greater personal responsibility; why arts and letters cannot flourish without freedom of expression and free intercourse with other cultures, etc. These ideas, too must be presented within concrete settings, in concrete terms, and without sermonizing.

All of the above, and much more, comes under the heading of the permanent campaign of democratic education which must go together with purposeful criticism of the Communist dictatorship. Constant self-education by American advisory personnel and emigre writers, in New York and Munich, is an inescapable part of meaningful discourse with the Soviet audience. Self-education requires the persistent study and reexamination of Soviet life. It means recognizing that life in the Soviet Union is not static, that what was true five years ago, or six months ago, may no longer be true today. It means fighting against the permanent danger of succumbing to one's own imperfect image of present Soviet reality.

Accentuating the positive through democratic education and sober discourse becomes even more imperative if the present Soviet drive to raise living standards gets beyond the realm of promises to the area of even partial achievement. As against any appreciable improvement in Soviet living conditions, the only effective political weapon is the weapon of democratic education, the argument that actually persuades decisive elements in that

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Soviet audience that the economic concessions of the dictatorship are no adequate substitute for democratic safeguards and liberties; for responsible, representative government; for normal relations with other countries; for an enlightened foreign policy that ends the menace of a third world war.

The most spectacular thing Radio Liberation can do is to talk plain, hard sense, and nothing but sense, seven days a week, 365 days a year. If it does, it will gradually win an interested and perhaps crucial segment of Soviet opinion to a clearer understanding of the need to replace the present regime with a government that menaces neither its own citizens nor the rest of the world. No propaganda weapon can do more.

FOOTNOTE ON SEMANTICS

A dictionary of "good" and "bad" usages for Radio Liberation is not practicable. For this purpose, a treatise on the semantic shadings of each operative word, in a wide variety of contexts, would be needed. The same difficulty arises in attempting to define when an ordinary word or phrase (as distinguished from an obvious stale figure of speech or hackneyed string of adjectives) is used as a cliché, and when the same word or phrase is used as a tool for meaningful discourse.

To illustrate this problem, and to emphasize the need for much closer editorial attention to the "meaning of meanings" in future Radio Liberation programs, I have invented two fictitious broadcasts. In each of these, the words Communism, Soviet Union, peace-loving, Russian, Russia, tyranny, justice, democracy, truth, freedom, Western culture, Karl Marx, propaganda lie, free world, Christian, America and Bolsheviks appear.

In the first broadcast, each usage would contribute to awaken the maximum hostility of almost any Russian listener against Radio Liberation and against the West generally, and would tend to strengthen whatever loyalty, however slight or great, he feels toward the present regime. In the second broadcast, the same words, both because of their context and because they are used more concretely and meaningfully, would not antagonize the identical public. Somewhere between the two deliberate extremes presented here, is the average Radio Liberation broadcast. By a constant awareness of the vital importance of the semantic problem, that average can be improved each day. The good intentions of the script writer are not enough, for "it is the tone that makes the music" and if "the strings are false" then the message reaches neither the heart nor the mind of the audience.

1.

"On his release from the Allied prison in Spandau, the noted fighter against Communism, Admiral Doenitz, told an audience of former SS officers that the Soviet Union was a threat to all peace-loving peoples. He predicted

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that Russian tyranny would not prevent the ultimate triumph of justice, democracy, truth and freedom. He said that Western culture owed an external debt to Goebbels for his vigorous propaganda in exposing Karl Marx as the philosopher of the lie. Admiral Doenitz pointed out that under Nazi leadership, the Third Reich had stood as the bastion of the free world. Just as all true Christians had supported Adolf Hitler in his crusade against the Bolsheviks, concluded Doenitz, so they would support America in the coming war against Russia.

2.

" 'Some of the most notable contributions to Western culture in the 19th century and to the development of literature in America came from such Russian writers as Tolstoy, Turgenev and Dostoevsky', said George Kennan, former American ambassador to the Soviet Union. Speaking before a group of former Soviet officers in Berlin, Kennan said that no one who respected truth would seriously maintain that the Russians, as a people, were less peace-loving than Americans. He claimed that the workings of the jury system in Russia from 1864 to 1917 had shown that the average Russian worker and peasant had a highly developed sense of justice. He pointed to the work of the zemstvos and the four State Dumas of 1906 to 1917 as hopeful beginnings of democracy, both at the local and national levels. Kennan took issue with those who maintained that Stalin's tyranny had destroyed the desire for freedom in the Soviet Union.

" 'Merely because some dogmatists have tried to make Karl Marx an infallible prophet', continued Kennan, 'is no reason to go to the other extreme and brand as a lie his criticism of certain abuses of the capitalist system of a century ago.' The former American ambassador maintained that the struggle against these abuses had motivated some of the early Bolsheviks who left the party when they became convinced that it did not serve the interests of the working people. He said that a regime which sends millions of human beings to concentration camps cannot claim to be guided by the principles of Communism, as the first Christians understood and practiced these principles, and as they survive to this day in some religious sects and monastic orders.

" 'The free world will become a reality, instead of a vague propaganda phrase', concluded Kennan, 'when people in Warsaw, Leningrad, Kiev and Shanghai enjoy the same political and economic safeguards as those who live today in London, Paris and New York.'"
